2. The truth of the above proposition, and of that only, really
corresponds with the universal conviction of the race. This conviction
is expressed in two ways.
(1.) When blame is affirmed of the operations of the Intelligence or
Sensibility, it is invariably thus affirmed: "You have no right to
_entertain_ such thoughts or sentiments. You have no right _indulge_
such feeling's." In other words, praise or blame is never directly
predicated of these operations themselves, but of the action of the Will
relatively to them.
(2.) All men agree, that the moral character of all actions, of all
states of mind whatever; depends upon _intention_. In no point is there
a more universal harmony among moral philosophers than in respect to
this. But intention is undeniably a phenomenon of the Will, and of that
exclusively. We must therefore admit, that moral obligation is
predicable of the Will only, or deny the fundamental convictions of the
race.
3. The truth of the above propositions is intuitively evident, the
moment the mind apprehends their real import. A man, as he steps out of
a warm room, amid the external frosts of winter, feels an involuntary
chill over his whole system. We might with the same propriety attribute
blame to him for such feelings, as for any other feelings, thoughts, or
perceptions which exist alike independent of his Will, and especially in
opposition to its determinations.
4. If we suppose all the voluntary acts and states of a moral agent to
be, and always to have been, in perfect conformity to moral rectitude,
it is impossible for us to impute moral guilt to him for any feelings or
thoughts which may have risen in his mind independently of his Will. We
can no more conceive him to have incurred ill desert, than we can
conceive of the annihilation of space. We may safely put it to the
consciousness of every man whether this is not the case. This renders
demonstrably evident the truth, that moral obligation is predicable only
of the Will.
5. With the above perfectly harmonize the positive teachings of
Inspiration. For example. "Lust, when it is _conceived_, bringeth forth
sin." The involuntary feeling does not constitute the sin, but the
action of the Will in harmony with that feeling.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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