Does civilization need religion? : $b A study in the social resources and limitations of religion in modern lifeNiebuhr, Reinhold
Religion
Does civilization need religion? : $b A study in the social resources and limitations of religion in modern life
Niebuhr, Reinhold
Christian civilization; Christianity; Philosophy and religion
There is, in short, no reason why religion should not hold to its
faith in God without either identifying him with or losing him in the
concrete world. The moral and spiritual values in which religion is
interested have a basis in concrete actuality. They are on the one hand
not a mere effervescence on the surface of the concrete, and on the
other hand they are not the only basis of historical realities. The
pluralism of William James, which has been criticized as scientifically
inaccurate and metaphysically inconsistent, seems to have both
scientific and metaphysical virtues. There is good reason to accept at
least a qualified dualism not only because it is morally more potent
than traditional monisms, but because it is metaphysically acceptable.
It is not to be expected that science will ever invest the concept
of God with the attributes which religious devotion assigns to it.
But there is no reason why religious and moral experience should not
build further upon the foundation laid by science. It is manifestly
necessary to have some metaphysical basis for religious conviction, for
there is no spiritual vigor in the conscious self-deception of purely
subjective religions. But it is not necessary to limit religion to
the bare concepts which science establishes. It is in fact better for
religion to forego perfect metaphysical consistency for the sake of
moral potency. In a sense religion is always forced to choose between
an adequate metaphysics and an adequate ethics. That is not to say that
the two interests are incompatible but that they are not identical.
When there is a conflict between them it is better to leave the
metaphysical problem with some loose ends than to develop a religion
which is inimical to moral values. The reason why naïve religions have
frequently been morally more potent than highly rationalized ones is
not because the faith which gave them moral fervor was necessarily
inconsistent with the facts, but because they based their affirmations
upon facts and experiences which were inconsistent with each other
or seemed to be but were equally true and equally necessary for the
maintenance of moral and spiritual energy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account