The strength of the Dutch army lies undoubtedly in its corps of officers, a body of specially qualified men fitted to discharge the duties that devolve on the leaders of any army. The majority of these pass through the Royal Military Academy, an institution from which we might borrow some features with advantage. Candidates are admitted between the ages of fifteen and eighteen, and undergo a course of four years before they are eligible for a commission. As the charges at the Academy are limited to _£22 10s_. a year, the expense of becoming an officer forms no prohibitive barrier, and in a course of training spread over four years the cadet can be turned into a fully qualified officer before he is entrusted with the discharge of practical duties. Moreover, his training does not stop with his leaving the Academy. It is supposed to be necessary to complete it by a further course in camps of instruction, and subsequently by what are called State missions in the temporary service of other armies. This practice is fairly general on the Continent, although it is never resorted to by the British, who are less acquainted with the organization of Continental armies than is the case with even third or fourth-rate States. The headquarters of the Dutch Engineers are at Utrecht, of the Artillery at Zwolle, of the Infantry at The Hague, and of the Cavalry at Breda. Utrecht is the most important of these military stations, because the Engineers are the most important branch of the army, and also because it is the centre of the canal and dyke System of Holland. The school or college of the State Civil Engineers, to whom is entrusted the care of the dykes, is at Utrecht. They are known as Waterstaat, and Utrecht may be held to supplement and complete the machinery existing at the capital, Amsterdam, for flooding the country. In theory and on paper, the defence of Holland is based on the assumption that in the event of invasion the country surrounding Amsterdam to as far as Utrecht on one side and Leyden on the other would be flooded. There are many who doubt whether the resolution to sanction the enormous attendant damage would be displayed. It is said that the national spirit does not beat so high as when the youthful William resorted to that measure in 1672 to baffle the French monarch, and then prepared his fleet, in the event of its failure, to convey the relics of Dutch greatness and the fortunes of Orange to a new home and country beyond the seas. On that occasion the waters did their work thoroughly well. But it is said that they might not accomplish what was expected of them on the next occasion, while the damage inflicted would remain. Nothing can solve this question save the practical test, but there is no reason to believe that at heart the Dutch race of to-day is less patriotic or resolute than formerly.