The statement that there is a portion of everything in everything, is not to be understood as referring simply to the original mixture of things before the formation of the worlds (fr. 1). On the contrary, even now “all things are together,” and everything, however small and however great, has an equal number of “portions” (fr. 6). A smaller particle of matter could only contain a smaller number of portions, if one of those portions ceased to be; but if anything _is_, in the full Parmenidean sense, it is impossible that mere division should make it cease to be (fr. 3). Matter is infinitely divisible; for there is no least thing, any more than there is a greatest. But however great or small a body may be, it contains just the same number of “portions,” that is, a portion of everything. [Sidenote: The portions.] 129. What are these “things” of which everything contains a portion? It once was usual to represent the theory of Anaxagoras as if he had said that wheat, for instance, contained small particles of flesh, blood, bones, and the like; but we have just seen that matter is infinitely divisible (fr. 3), and that there are as many “portions” in the smallest particle as in the greatest (fr. 6). This is fatal to the old view. If everything were made up of minute particles of everything else, we could certainly arrive at a point where everything was “unmixed,” if only we carried division far enough. This difficulty can only be solved in one way.[690] In fr. 8 the examples given of things which are not “cut off from one another with a hatchet” are the hot and the cold; and elsewhere (frs. 4, 15), mention is made of the other traditional “opposites.” Aristotle says that, if we suppose the first principles to be infinite, they may either be one in kind, as with Demokritos, or opposite.[691] Simplicius, following Porphyry and Themistios, refers the latter view to Anaxagoras;[692] and Aristotle himself implies that the opposites of Anaxagoras had as much right to be called first principles as the “homoeomeries.”[693] Footnote 690: See Tannery, _Science hellène_, pp. 283 sqq. I still think that Tannery’s interpretation is substantially right, though his statement of it requires some modification. Footnote 691: Arist. _Phys._ Α, 2. 184 b 21, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἔν, σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας. Footnote 692: _Phys._ p. 44, 1. He goes on to refer to θερμότητας ... καὶ ψυχρότητας ξηρότητάς τε καὶ ὑγρότητας μανότητάς τε καὶ πυκνότητας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας κατὰ ποιότητα ἐναντιότητας. He observes, however, that Alexander rejected this interpretation and took διαφερούσας ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας closely together as both referring to Demokritos. Footnote 693: _Phys._ Α, 4. 187 a 25, τὸν μὲν (Ἀναξαγόραν) ἄπειρα ποιεῖν τά τε ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τἀναντία. Aristotle’s own theory only differs from this in so far as he makes ὕλη prior to the ἐναντία.