165. The fragments which we have come from Simplicius, and are given, with the exception of the first, from the text of Diels.[899] Footnote 897: Diog. ix. 24 (R. P. 141). It is possible, of course, that Apollodoros meant the first and not the fourth year of the Olympiad. That is his usual era, the foundation of Thourioi. But, on the whole, it is more likely that he meant the fourth; for the date of the ναυαρχία would be given with precision. See Jacoby, p. 270. Footnote 898: Diog. ix. 24 (R. P. 141). Footnote 899: It is no longer necessary to discuss the passages which used to appear as frs. 1-5 of Melissos, as it has been proved by A. Pabst that they are merely a paraphrase of the genuine fragments (_De Melissi Samii fragmentis_, Bonn, 1889). Almost simultaneously I had independently come to the same conclusion (see the first edition, § 138). Zeller and Diels have both accepted Pabst’s demonstration, and the supposed fragments have been relegated to the notes in the last edition of R. P. I still believe, however, that the fragment which I have numbered 1_a_ is genuine. See next note. (1_a_) If nothing is, what can be said of it as of something real?[900] (1) What was was ever, and ever shall be. For, if it had come into being, it needs must have been nothing before it came into being. Now, if it were nothing, in no wise could anything have arisen out of nothing. R. P. 142. (2) Since, then, it has not come into being, and since it is, was ever, and ever shall be, it has no beginning or end, but is without limit. For, if it had come into being, it would have had a beginning (for it would have begun to come into being at some time or other) and an end (for it would have ceased to come into being at some time or other); but, if it neither began nor ended, and ever was and ever shall be, it has no beginning or end; for it is not possible for anything to be ever without all being. R. P. 143. (3) Further, just as it ever is, so it must ever be infinite in magnitude. R. P. 143. (4) But nothing which has a beginning or end is either eternal or infinite. R. P. 143. (5) If it were not one, it would be bounded by something else. R. P. 144 a. (6) For if it is (infinite), it must be one; for if it were two, it could not be infinite; for then they would be bounded by one another.[901] R. P. 144. (6_a_) (And, since it is one, it is alike throughout; for if it were unlike, it would be many and not one.)[902]