The Understanding seems for the most part to take cognizance of _actions_ only, and from these to infer _motives_ and _character_; but the sense we have been speaking of proceeds in a contrary course; and determines of _actions_ from certain _first principles of character_, which seem wholly out of the reach of the Understanding. We cannot indeed do otherwise than admit that there must be distinct principles of character in every distinct individual: The manifest variety even in the minds of infants will oblige us to this. But what _are_ these first principles of character? Not the objects, I am persuaded, of the Understanding; and yet we take as strong Impressions of them as if we could compare and assort them in a syllogism. We often love or hate at first sight; and indeed, in general, dislike or approve by some secret reference to these _principles_; and we judge even of conduct, not from any idea of abstract good or evil in the nature of actions, but by referring those actions to a supposed original character in the man himself. I do not mean that we _talk_ thus; we could not indeed, if we would, explain ourselves in detail on this head; we can neither account for Impressions and passions, nor communicate them to others by _words_: Tones and looks will sometimes convey the _passion_ strangely, but the _Impression_ is incommunicable. The same causes may produce it indeed at the same time in many, but it is the separate possession of each, and not in its nature transferable: It is an imperfect sort of instinct, and proportionably dumb.—We might indeed, if we chose it, candidly confess to one another that we are greatly swayed by these feelings, and are by no means so _rational_ in all points as we could wish; but this would be a betraying of the interests of that high faculty, the Understanding, which we so value ourselves upon, and which we more peculiarly call our own. This, we think, must not be; and so we huddle up the matter, concealing it as much as possible, both from ourselves and others. In Books indeed, wherein character, motive, and action, are all alike subjected to the Understanding, it is generally a very clear case; and we make decisions compounded of them all: And thus we are willing to approve of _Candide_, tho’ he kills my Lord the Inquisitor, and runs thro’ the body the Baron of _Thunder-ten-tronckh_, the son of his patron, and the brother of his beloved _Cunégonde_: But in real life, I believe, _my Lords the Judges_ would be apt to inform the _Gentlemen of the Jury_ that my _Lord the Inquisitor_ was _ill killed_; as _Candide_ did not proceed on the urgency of the moment, but on the speculation only of future evil. And indeed this clear perception, in Novels and Plays, of the union of character and action not seen in nature, is the principal defect of such compositions, and what renders them but ill pictures of human life, and wretched guides of conduct.