"Secondly, if Y _is_ a prime, it immediately follows that _n_ cannot be the greatest prime, for Y is greater than _n_. Hence, however great may be any prime that we may assume, there will always be one that is greater, and even if we do not succeed in expressing it in figures, we see that it must certainly exist. Thus by studying carefully a particular case--the prime _n_, which was assumed to be the greatest possible one--we have arrived at a general theorem which states that there is no limit to the number of primes. Is not that, too, a triumph of intuition?" "Certainly," said Einstein. "But you must not overlook the fact that a theorem of this kind cannot be ranked with a theorem of a fundamentally axiomatic character. The one you have discussed has been derived by a clever process of reasoning, but it does not exhibit the characteristic of a momentous discovery. This theorem of Euclid can be imagined absent from science without the content of truth in science being essentially effected. Compare with it a theorem of axiomatic significance, such as Galilei's Law of Inertia, or Newton's Law of Gravitation. Theorems such as the latter are characterized by being starting-points of knowledge that are inexhaustible in the consequences that may be deduced from them. Your question, earlier, as to whether I consider the deductive method superior to the inductive, was not formulated in correct terms. To this I answered above that the inductive method as a means of discovering general truths usually appears over-estimated. The proper form of the question is: Which truths are of the higher order, those that are found inductively, or those that lead to further deduction? There can scarcely be doubt about the answer." "No, that is certainly true. If I understand your meaning rightly, the answer may be expressed by an allegory. Intuition of the highest order creates treasure-mines, those of lesser degree individual articles of value that are significant in themselves, although they cannot be compared with the inestimable value of the mines. The fact that the highest intuition is found in minds with a mathematical trend makes it appear possible that Kant's remark may gain more and more credence in the future. It already applies in a measure to subjects to which it seemed inapplicable during Kant's lifetime, for example, in Psychology, in which the relations between stimulus and response have been established mathematically only since the Weber-Fechner Law was set up; and also, since the time of Quetelet, in Moral Science and Sociology, we learn from mathematical methods of statistics and probability that even Man as an active being is subjected to mechanical causality. At any rate it seems manifest that Kant's remark, that in every science there is just as much truth as there is mathematics, has received additional support in recent times."