Elements of Criticism, Volume I.Kames, Henry Home, Lord
Philosophy
Elements of Criticism, Volume I.
Kames, Henry Home, Lord
Criticism; Literary style
Sensible Beings considered as objects of passion, lead us into a more
complex theory. A sensible being that is agreeable by its attributes,
inspires us with a pleasant emotion; and the desire included in this
emotion has evidently different means of gratification. A man regarding
himself only, may be satisfied with viewing and contemplating this
being, precisely as if it were inanimate; or he may desire the more
generous gratification of making it happy. Were man altogether selfish,
it would be conformable to his nature, that he should indulge the
pleasant emotion without making any acknowledgement to the person who
gives him pleasure, more than to a pure air or temperate clime when he
enjoys these benefits. But as man is endued with a principle of
benevolence as well as of selfishness, he is prompted by his nature to
desire the good of every sensible being that gives him pleasure. And the
final cause of desire so directed, is illustrious. It contributes to a
man’s own happiness, by affording him more means of gratification than
he can have when his desire terminates upon himself alone; and at the
same time it tends eminently to improve the happiness of those with whom
he is connected. The directing our desires in this manner, occasions a
beautiful coalition of self-love with benevolence; for both are equally
promoted by the same internal impulse, and by the same external conduct.
And this consideration, by the way, ought to silence those minute
philosophers, who, ignorant of human nature, teach a most disgustful
doctrine. That to serve others unless with a view to our own good, is
weakness and folly; as if self-love only contributed to happiness and
not benevolence. The hand of God is too visible in the human frame, to
permit us to think seriously, that there ever can be any jarring or
inconsistency among natural principles, those especially of self-love
and benevolence, which regulate the bulk of our actions.
Next in order come sensible Beings that are in affliction or pain. It is
disagreeable to behold a person in distress; and therefore this object
must raise in the spectator an uneasy emotion. Were man purely a selfish
being, he would be prompted by his nature to turn from every object,
animate or inanimate, that gives him uneasiness. But the principle of
benevolence gives an opposite direction to his desire. It impels him to
afford relief; and by relieving the person from distress, his desire is
fully gratified. Our benevolence to a person in distress is inflamed
into an emotion of sympathy, signifying in Greek the painful emotion
that is raised in us by that person. Thus sympathy, though a painful
emotion, is in its nature attractive. And with respect to its final
cause, we can be at no loss. It not only tends to relieve a
fellow-creature from pain, but in its gratification is greatly more
pleasant than if it were repulsive.
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