_Consult further_:—F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 13, 14; T. Case, _Physical Realism_, pt. 1; L. T. Hobhouse, _The Theory of Knowledge_, pt. 3, chap. 3, _The Conception of External Reality_; H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i. chap. 7 (pp. 207-231 of vol. i. in Eng. trans.); J. S. Mackenzie, _Outlines of Metaphysics_, bk. i. chap. 3, _Theories of Metaphysics_; J. Royce, _The World and the Individual_, First Series (Lecture on the First Conception of Being). ----- Footnote 31: See, in particular, Royce, _The World and the Individual_, Second Series, Lecture 1, for a telling elaboration of this thought. I should note that I do not myself use the term “existence,” as is sometimes done, with special restriction to the sense of presence as a sensible event at a particular point of space and time. When so used, it is, of course, much narrower in scope than the term “Being.” Footnote 32: Compare the brilliant but not altogether convincing argument of Professor James, in _The Will to Believe_. Footnote 33: See the whole treatment of question of feeling in Dr. Stout’s _Manual of Psychology_. I do not, of course, mean that “consciousness of activity” successful or thwarted as a fact precedes and conditions pleasure-pain. On the contrary, it is a familiar fact of experience that we often learn what our purposes are for the first time by the pain which attends their defeat. _E.g._, a man may first realise that he is, and has been, in love by his pain at his mistress’s preference of a rival suitor. And nothing seems more certain than that many pleasures are quite independent of “actual conation,” as Plato long ago recognised. I must take this opportunity to guard once for all against some plausible misconceptions. (_a_) When I speak of feeling as “purposive” or “teleological,” I do not mean to make what, to my own mind, would be the monstrous assumption, that it necessarily presupposes _conscious_ anticipation of its guiding end or purpose. All that I mean is that the processes of conscious life are as a matter of fact only intelligible with reference to the results in which they culminate and which they serve to maintain; or again, that they all involve the kind of continuity of interest which belong to attention. (_b_) If attentive interest is not necessarily actual conation, actual conscious effort, still less is it necessarily actual _will_. For me, as for Mr. Bradley (see his article in _Mind_ for October 1902), where there is no ideal anticipation of the result of a process there is neither actual desire nor actual will. And since I cannot see that all attention implies ideal anticpation, I certainly could not agree with Prof. Royce that ultimate Reality is simply the “internal meaning of an _idea_.”