Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
We ought, then, to be prepared to find the same state of things
universally in the relation of Reality to its Appearances. In a world
where “higher” and “lower,” “more” and “less” true have a meaning, some
of the lesser systems in which the nature of the whole is expressed must
be fuller and more adequate representations of that nature than others.
This is as much as to say that it would require comparatively little
transformation of some of the partial systems recognised by our
knowledge to show how the common nature of the whole system of Reality
is expressed in them; in other cases the amount of transformation
required to show how the whole repeats itself in the part would be much
more extensive. To take a single instance, if our preceding analysis of
the general nature of Reality is sound, we can see much more clearly how
that nature reappears in the structure of a human mind than how it is
exhibited in what we call a physical thing, and we may therefore say the
human mind expresses the fundamental character of the whole system much
more fully and adequately than physical nature, as it exists for our
apprehension. More briefly, the same thought may be expressed by saying
that Reality has degrees, and that the forms of Appearance in which its
common nature is most fully and clearly manifested have the highest
degrees of reality.
§ 3. This conception of Reality as capable of degrees may at first seem
paradoxical. How can anything, it will be asked, be more or less “real”
than anything else? Must not anything either be entirely real or not
real at all? But the same difficulty might be raised about the
recognition of degree in other cases where its validity is now
universally admitted. Thus to some minds it has appeared that there can
be no degrees of the infinite or the infinitesimal; all infinites, and
again all zeros, have been declared to be manifestly equal. Yet it
hardly seems possible to escape the conclusion that the concept of
successive orders of infinitely great, and again of infinitely small,
magnitudes is not only intelligible but absolutely necessary if our
thought on quantitative subjects is to be consistent (When the sides of
a rectangle, for instance, become infinitely great or infinitely small
relatively to whatever is our standard of comparison, it still remains a
rectangle, and its area therefore is still determined by the product of
its sides, and is therefore infinitely great or small, as the case may
be, in relation not only to our original standard but to the sides
themselves.[68]) What is in one sense not a matter of degree, may yet in
another not only admit but positively require the distinction of degrees
of more and less. And this is precisely the case with Reality as it
manifests itself in its various appearances. In the sense that it is the
same single experience-system which appears as a whole and in its whole
nature in every one of the subordinate experience-systems, they are all
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account