Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
The fundamental defect in Professor Royce’s reasoning seems to me to
lie in the tacit transition from the notion of an infinite _series_ to
that of an infinite completed _sum_. Thus he speaks of the series of
prime numbers as a “whole” being present at once to the mind of God.
But are the prime numbers, or any other infinite series, an actual sum
at all? They are surely not proved to be so by the existence of
general truths about any prime number.
Footnote 95:
See, _e.g._, Dedekind, _op. cit._, § 2: “It frequently happens that
different things _a_, _b_, _c_ ... are apprehended upon whatsoever
occasion under a common point of view, mentally put together, and it
is then said that they form a _system_; the things _a_, _b_, _c_ ...
are named the _elements_ of the system”; and § 3 (definitions of
_whole_ and _part_).
Footnote 96:
_Ante_, Bk. II. chap. 2, § 5.
Footnote 97:
It is no answer to this view to urge that as soon as the intellect
undertakes to reflect upon and describe Reality it unavoidably does so
in relational terms. For it is our contention that the same intellect
which uses these relational methods sees _why_ they are inadequate,
and to some extent at least how they are ultimately merged in a higher
type of experience. Thus the systematic use of the intellect in
Metaphysics itself leads to the conviction that the mere intellect is
not the whole of Reality. Or, in still more paradoxical language, the
highest truth for the mere intellect is the thought of Reality as an
ordered system. But all such order is based in the end on the
number-series with its category of whole and part, and cannot,
therefore, be a perfectly adequate representation of a
supra-relational Reality. Hence Truth, from its own nature, can never
be quite the same thing as Reality.
Footnote 98:
Or does Dr. Stout merely mean that there may be a hat and a head, and
also a relation of on and under (_e.g._, between the _hat_ and the
_peg_), and yet my hat not be on my head? If this is his meaning, I
reply we have not really got the _relation_ and its _terms_; if the
hat is not on the head, hat and head are not terms in the relation at
all. I do not see why, on his own principles, Dr. Stout should not add
a fourth factor to his analysis, namely, qualified_ness_, or the fact
that the qualities are there, and so on indefinitely.
Footnote 99:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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