When we come to deal with the special problems of moral and social life, we shall have to face further questions as to the connection of causal determination with moral freedom and responsibility, and again with conscious purposive action for ends. Our previous discussion will then be found to have cleared the way for these more complex questions, by removing the difficulties which arise when the causal postulate is mistaken for an axiomatic principle of the interpretation of the systematic nature of Reality. _Consult further_:—B. Bosanquet, _Essentials of Logic_, pp. 164, 165; _Logic_, vol. i p. 253 ff., vol. ii. p. 212 ff.; F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 5 (Motion and Change), 6 (Causation), 7 (Activity), 8 (Things); H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i. chaps. 4 (Becoming and Change), 5 (Nature of Physical Action); L. T. Hobhouse, _Theory of Knowledge_, pt. 2, chaps. 8, 15 (for discussion of “Plurality” of Causes); Karl Pearson, _Grammar of Science_, chaps. 3 and 4; B. Russell, _Philosophy of Leibniz_, chaps. 4, 11 (Pre-established Harmony); James Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, pt. 1, lectures 2-6; Hume’s famous discussion of Causation (_Treatise of Human Nature_, bk. i. pt. 3, §§ 3-15) seems to me to have lost little of its value, and to be still perhaps the most important single contribution of modern Philosophy to the systematic discussion of Causality. ----- Footnote 100: For a discussion of the same point in dealing with _energy_, see Professor Schuster, _British Association Report_, 1892, p. 631. Footnote 101: W. M‘Dougall in _Mind_ for July 1902, p. 350. Footnote 102: See the admirable remarks of Bosanquet in _Companion to Plato’s Republic_, pp. 275, 276. Footnote 103: On the category of Ground and Consequent and the principle of Sufficient Reason, consult Bosanquet, _Logic_, bk. i. chap. 6, and bk. ii. chap. 7. Footnote 104: It is no answer to this suggestion to urge that the present, being real, cannot be conditioned by the future, which is unreal. Such a rejoinder commits the metaphysical _petitio principii_ of taking for granted that only the present is real. It is obvious that one might say with equal cogency that the past, being over and gone, is now unreal and therefore cannot influence the real present. Footnote 105: For a fuller explanation of what is meant by continuity, consult Dedekind, _Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen_, specially §§ 3-5, or Lamb’s _Infinitesimal Calculus_, chap. 1. Readers who have been accustomed to the treatment of continuity by the older philosophical writers should specially remark (1) that continuity is properly a characteristic of _series_, and (2) that though continuity implies indefinite divisibility, the reverse is not, as was sometimes assumed by earlier writers, true. The series of rational numbers is a familiar illustration of endless divisibility _without_ continuity. Footnote 106: