Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
_Consult further_:—F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 26
(pp. 496-497, 1st ed.); H. Lotze, _Outlines of Metaphysic_, pp. 77-79;
J. S. Mackenzie, _Outlines of Metaphysics_, bk. iii. chap. 2; J. Ward,
_Naturalism and Agnosticism_. lect. 1.
-----
Footnote 117:
_I.e._ existence of the _same kind_ as that perceived by the senses,
whether actually so perceived or not. In this sense the solid
impenetrable extended atoms of Newton or Locke are “sensible”
existence, inasmuch as their properties are the same in kind as
certain perceptible properties of larger masses, though they are not
themselves actually perceptible.
Footnote 118:
Of course the evolution must be mere subjective appearance if, as is
sometimes assumed, the processes of the physical order are one and all
purely mechanical. But this only shows that the current concept of the
physical order is not free from inconsistencies.
-----
CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF MATTER
§ 1. The physical order, because dependent for its perceived qualities
on the sense-organs of the percipient, must be the appearance of a
more ultimate reality which is non-physical. § 2. Berkeley’s
criticism is fatal to the identification of this reality with
“material substance.” The logical consequence of Berkeley’s doctrine
that the _esse_ of sensible things is _percipi_ would be the
subjectivist view that the physical order is _only_ a complex of
presentations. § 3. But this is clearly not the case with that part
of the physical order which consists of the bodies of my fellow-men.
These have an existence, as centres of feeling, over and above their
existence as presentations to my senses. § 4. As the bodies of my
fellows are connected in one system with the rest of the physical
order, that order as a whole must have the same kind of reality
which belongs to them. It must be the presentation to our sense of a
system or complex of systems of experiencing subjects; the apparent
absence of life and purpose from inorganic nature must be due to our
inability to enter into a direct communion of interest with its
members. § 5. Some consequences of this view.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive