Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
The events of the physical order, it may be urged, cannot be expressions
of the more or less conscious purposes and interests of individual
centres of experience, and that for a simple reason. How a purposive
agent will behave is always a mystery, except to those who actually
understand his purposes. It is impossible, apart from actual insight
into those purposes, to infer from the mere examination of his past
behaviour what his behaviour in the future will be. For the special
characteristic of purposive action is its power to find new ways of
response to stimulus. Hence it is that we rightly regard the power to
learn by experience, that is, to acquire more and more _appropriate_
reactions to stimulus, as the test of a creature’s intelligence. Where
there is no progressive adaptability there is no ground to assume
intelligence and purpose. Hence again the impossibility of calculating
beforehand with any certainty what course the behaviour of an
intelligent being will take, unless you are actually aware of the
purposes he is seeking to realise.
Now, except in the case of the organic world, it may be urged, we do not
find progressive _adaptability_ in Nature. The inorganic constituents of
the physical order always react with absolute uniformity in the same way
upon the same environment. Their behaviour exhibits absolutely
undeviating conformity to general routine laws of sequence, and can
therefore be calculated beforehand, provided that the resources of our
mathematics are adequate to deal with the problems it presents, with
absolute exactitude and certainty. That this routine uniformity exists
in physical nature is, in fact, a fundamental principle in the logic of
inductive science. Every indication of sentience and purpose is thus
absent from physical nature, outside the world of living organisms; it
is a realm of rigid conformity to laws of sequence. And these sequences,
because absolutely without exception and incapable of modification, are
purely _mechanical_, _i.e._ non-purposive and non-intelligent. Nature
is, in fact, a complicated _mechanism_, in which every event follows
from its conditions with undeviating _necessity_.
Views of this kind are often supposed to be logically necessitated by
the principles of physical science. It is manifest that if they are
sound our whole preceding interpretation of the physical order is
invalidated. For this reason, as well as because of the far-reaching
consequences often drawn from them as to human freedom and moral
responsibility, it will be necessary to examine their foundation in some
detail.
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