Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
purpose, are never identical, though it may be no difference could be
detected in them apart from that relation to this peculiar purpose.
Relatively to the system of intelligent purposes which realises itself
through the circumstances, every situation is, properly speaking,
unique.
Now, if we consider the methods by which the uniformities called “laws”
of nature are actually formulated, we may see ground to conclude that
they may one and all be uniformities of the approximate non-exact type.
In many cases, if not all, these uniformities have manifestly been
obtained by statistical methods. Thus, for example, when it is said that
all the atoms of a given chemical element are absolutely alike, _e.g._,
that every atom of oxygen has the atomic weight 16, there is absolutely
no valid ground for regarding this uniformity as actually realised
without deviation in individual cases. If the atom should prove, as it
may, to be no more than a convenient device of our own, useful for
computing the behaviour of sensible masses but with no real existence of
its own, it is of course evident that there can be no question of the
real conformity of individual cases to the law. But even if there really
are indivisible bodies answering to our conception of atoms, still we
have to remember that we have no means of dealing with the individual
atom directly. We infer its properties indirectly from the behaviour of
the sensible masses with which we can deal more directly. Hence, at
most, the statement that the atom of oxygen has a certain weight means
no more than that we can for our practical purposes disregard any
possible individual divergences from this value. The oxygen atoms, if
they really exist, might actually fluctuate in individual atomic weight
about an average; yet, so long as we cannot deal with them individually
but only in bulk, these fluctuations, if only sufficiently small, would
produce no appreciable effect on our results, and would therefore
properly be treated in our science as non-existent. Conceivably, then,
such chemical uniformities may afford no safer ground for precise
statements about the weight of the individual atom, than anthropological
statistics do for precise statement about the actual height, weight, or
expectation of life of an individual man. And we can readily see that a
non-human observer with senses incapable of perceiving the individual
differences between one man and another, might be led from the apparent
uniformity of behaviour exhibited by large collections of human beings
to the same sort of conclusions which we are tempted to make about
atoms.[133]
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