Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
A purposive adaptation
to environment with consequent deviation from uniformity in reaction
would necessarily escape our notice if it took place with the rapidity
of the beat of a gnat’s wing, or again, if it required centuries for its
establishment.[135]
Other similar subjective conditions which would necessarily cut us off
from the recognition of purposive fresh adaptations widely different
from those which occur in our own life, are the limitations of our power
of attending to more than a certain number of presentations
simultaneously; and again, the restriction of our sense-perception to a
few types, and the impossibility of perceiving contents belonging to
those types when they fall below or above the lower and upper
“thresholds” of sensibility. These considerations do not, of course,
positively prove that the routine uniformity of natural processes is
only subjective appearance, but they are sufficient to show that there
is no valid reason for taking it to be more, and in conjunction with our
previous positive argument for the sentient individuality of all real
existence, they suffice to bring our general interpretation of the
physical order under Mr. Bradley’s canon that “What must be and can be,
that _is_.”
§ 4. (3) What, then, are we to make of the principle of the “Uniformity
of Nature”? Any principle which does actual work in science must somehow
be capable of justification, and if our interpretation of the physical
order really conflicts with a fundamental scientific principle, it must
contain fallacy somewhere. Fortunately, there is no real conflict. In
dealing with the principle of Uniformity, we must distinguish very
carefully between the sense in which it is actually required for the
purposes of science and the sense which has been put upon it in the set
of metaphysical doctrines popularly but illogically deduced from the
actual procedure of the sciences. As we have seen already, it is
impossible to affirm the principle of Uniformity as an axiom of
systematic thought. It is also not capable of verification as an
empirical truth. Its logical character must therefore be that of a
postulate, an assumption defensible on the ground of practical
usefulness, but only so far as it actually succeeds.
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