One suggestion, already made in slightly different words, may be once more emphasised in conclusion. Even among human beings the relative prominence of fresh spontaneous adaptations and habitual reactions in the life of the individual fluctuates greatly with the different individuals. The “intelligence” of different men, as gauged by their power of fresh adaptive modification of established habits of reaction, ranges over a great variety of different values. If we could acquire the same kind of insight into the individual purposes of non-human agents that we have into those of our immediate fellows, we should presumably find an even wider range of differences in this respect. In principle we have no means of setting any definite limits to the range in either direction. We can conceive a degree of attentive control of reaction so complete that every reaction represents a fresh stage in the realisation of an underlying idea, so that intelligence is everything and habit nothing; and again, we can conceive a state of things in which mere habit is everything and intelligent spontaneity nothing. Somewhere between these ideal limits all cases of finite purposive intelligence must be comprised, and it would be easy to show that neither limit can be actually reached by finite intelligence, though there may be indefinite approximation to either.[140] _Consult further_:—H. Lotze, _Metaphysic_, bk. i. Introduction X. (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 18), bk. ii. chaps. 7, 8 (Eng. trans., vol. ii. pp. 66-162); E. Mach, _The Science of Mechanics_, pp. 481-504 (Eng. trans.); K. Pearson, _Grammar of Science_, chaps. 3 (The Scientific Law), 9 (The Laws of Motion); J. Royce, “Nature, Consciousness, and Self-consciousness” (in _Studies of Good and Evil_); J. Stallo, _Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics_, chaps. 1, 10-12 (metaphysical standpoint, “Phenomenalist”); J. Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, part 1, lects. 2-5. ----- Footnote 127: Speaking strictly, all necessity would appear to arise from the presence of conflicting purposes or interests in the _same_ experience. _E.g._, the logical necessity of affirming the conclusion when the premisses are affirmed, implies (1) the presence of the general purpose to think logically; (2) the presence of some purpose or interest which, if gratified, would demand the affirmation of a result inconsistent with the previously affirmed premisses; (3) the repression of this affirmation by the dominant purpose (1). I believe that careful analysis will reveal these same elements in every genuine case of necessitation. _I.e._ the mere defeat of my purpose is not true necessitation unless it is defeated by a second interest or purpose which I also identify with myself. Thus all necessity would ultimately be self-imposed. This is not without its bearing on Ethics, as we shall see. Footnote 128: Compare with what follows, F. H. Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, Essay 1, and _infra_, Bk. IV. chap. 4.