Elements of Military Art and Science: Or, Course Of Instruction In Strategy, Fortification, Tactics Of Battles, &C.; Embracing The Duties Of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, And Engineers; Adapted To The Use Of Volunteers And Militia; Third Edition; With Critical Notes On The Mexican And Crimean Wars.Halleck, H. W. (Henry Wager)
Philosophy
Elements of Military Art and Science: Or, Course Of Instruction In Strategy, Fortification, Tactics Of Battles, &C.; Embracing The Duties Of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, And Engineers; Adapted To The Use Of Volunteers And Militia; Third Edition; With Critical Notes On The Mexican And Crimean Wars.
Halleck, H. W. (Henry Wager)
Military art and science
We now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and
defence of Copenhagen itself. The only side of the town exposed to the
attack of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal
extending out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow
approach to the heart of the city, (Fig. 35) On the most advanced part
of this shoal are the Crown-batteries, carrying in all eighty-eight
guns.[21] The entrance into the Baltic between Copenhagen and Salthorn,
is divided into two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground, which
is situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the entrance on the
left of the Crown-batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel
four ships of the line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all
three hundred and fifty-eight guns. To secure the port and city from
bombardment from the King's Channel, (that between the Middle Ground and
town,) a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of the
shoal, and manned principally by volunteers. This line consisted of old
hulls of vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c., carrying in all six
hundred and twenty-eight guns--a force strong enough to prevent the
approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it was
intended,) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships of
war; but these the Danes thought would be deterred from approaching by
the difficulties of navigation. These difficulties were certainly very
great; and Nelson said, beforehand, that "the wind which might carry him
in would most probably not bring out a crippled ship." Had the Danes
supposed it possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels, the
line of floating defences would have been formed nearer Copenhagen, the
right supported by batteries raised on the isle of Amack. "In that
case," says Napoleon, "it is probable that Nelson would have failed in
his attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass between
the line and shore thus lined with cannon." As it was, the line was too
extended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive
assistance from the battery of Amack. A part of the fleet remained as a
reserve, under Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced
to the King's Channel. This attacking force consisted of eight ships of
the line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying in all eleven hundred
guns, (without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is
not given.) One of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought into
action, and two others grounded; but, Lord Nelson says, "although not in
the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of great
service." This force was concentrated upon _a part_ of the Danish line
of floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by
three hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond the
reach of succor, and without a chance of escape. The result was what
might have been expected.
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