We have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims that _an army should choose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should either pierce the enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communications with his base_. It is the opinion of men of the best military talent in our army that the Lake Champlain line satisfies all these conditions at the same time;--that it is the most direct, most feasible, and most decisive line which can be pursued in case of operations against Canada; and that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be well fortified in time of peace. All agree that the St. Lawrence above Quebec constitutes the _key_ point of the enemy's defence, and the _objective_ point towards which all our operations should be directed. To reach this point, all our Boards of Engineers have deemed it best to collect our troops at Albany and advance by Lake Champlain, a distance of only two hundred miles. Besides the advantages of a good water communication the whole distance for the transportation of military stores, there are several roads on each side, all concentrating on this line within our own territory. It has already been shown by the brief sketch of our northern wars, that this line has been the field of strife and blood for _fifteen campaigns_. Nature has marked it out as our shortest and easiest line of intercourse with Canada, both in peace and war. Military diversions will always be made on the eastern and western extremities of this frontier, and important secondary or auxiliary operations be carried on by the eastern and western routes; but until we overthrow the whole system of military science as established by the Romans, revived by Frederick and practised and improved by Napoleon, the _central and interior line_, under all ordinary circumstances, will furnish the greatest probabilities of success.