But it matters very little how we explain the nature of the duties toward God, provided we recognize them. Whether they be considered a distinct class, or whether we only see in them the highest degree of man's duties toward himself; all this is but a useless speculation. We could say conversely, and with equal justice, that our duties toward ourselves are but a part of our duties toward God: for duty itself, in its highest conception, being to reach after the highest possible perfection, we can say, with Plato, that virtue is the imitation of God; that, consequently, man owes it to himself to resemble God as much as possible, and that, conversely, he owes God, as the type of supreme perfection, to draw ever nearer to him through self-improvement. But how could he seek to draw nearer to God's supreme perfection if he did not entertain for him the feelings of love and respect, which constitute what we, in general, call religious sentiment? =168. Duties toward God.--Analysis of the religious sentiment.=--What is called _duties toward God_ is nothing else than the different acts by which we endeavor to bring about, cultivate, develop in us, or in others, religious sentiment. When these acts are external, and take a certain definite form, they constitute what is called _outward worship_, and are consequent upon positive religions. When they are concentrated in the soul, and confined to sentiments, they constitute what is called _inner worship_. The virtue which corresponds to these inner acts and sentiments is called _piety_. The duties toward God being thus blended with religious sentiment we must, in order to set them forth, first analyze this sentiment.