_Schumann's System: "Armoured Fronts."_--Lieut.-Colonel Maximilian Schumann (1827-1889) of the Prussian engineers, who took a very prominent part in the design and advocacy of armoured defences, eventually produced a system which dispensed entirely with forts and relied on the fire of protected guns. It consists of several lines of batteries for Q.F. guns and howitzers in cupolas. He considered that such batteries would be able to defend their own front, and the infantry garrison was not to be called into action except in the case of the enemy breaking through at some point of the line. This system was actually adopted by Rumania (1889-1892) for the Sereth Line. There are three routes by which the Russians can enter the country across the Sereth river: through Focshani, Nemolassa and Galatz. These three routes are barred by bridge-heads, those at Focshani, the most important, being on the left bank of the Milkov, a tributary of the Sereth. The Focshani works consist of 71 batteries arranged on a semicircular front about 12 m. long and from 8000 to 10,000 yds. in advance of the bridges. The batteries are placed in three lines, which are about 500 yds. apart, and are subdivided into groups. The normal group consists of 5 batteries, of which 3 are in the first line, 1 in the second, and 1 in the third. The first-line batteries each contain five small Q.F. guns in travelling cupolas. The second-line batteries, each six small Q.F. guns in disappearing cupolas. The third-line batteries have one 120-mm. gun in a cupola, and two 210-mm. spherical mortars with Gruson shields. The immediate defence of the batteries consists of a glacis planted with thorn bushes and a wire entanglement. [Illustration: From Leithner's _Bestandige Befestigung_. FIG. 58.--Cupola for 4.7-in. Howitzer.] The fortification of these three bridge-heads are said to have cost about L1,100,000. But the system of "armoured fronts" is never likely to be reproduced, having been condemned by all authoritative continental opinion. Its defects have been summarized by Schroeter as follows: weakness of artillery at long ranges, want of security against a surprise rush, the neglect of the use of infantry in the defence, and the difficulty of command. This last is the most serious of all. It is indeed difficult to conceive that any one should expect half-a-dozen expert gunners, each shut up in an iron box with a gun, to stop the rush of a thousand men, even by day. But imagine the feelings of the gunner on the night of a big attack, alone in his box, his nerves already strained by a preliminary bombardment and nights of watching. He hears the sounds of battle all around; he knows nothing of the progress of the attack, but expects everything, and feels every moment the door of his box being opened and the bayonet entering his back. No wise commander would submit his troops to such a test.