See F. Ehrle, "Die Spiritualen, ihr Verhaeltnis zum Franziskanerorden und zu den Fraticellen" and "Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Vienne," in _Archiv fuer Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters_, vols. i., ii., iii.; Wetzer and Welte, _Kirchenlexikon_, s.v. "Fraticellen"; H. C. Lea, _History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages_, iii. 129-180 (London, 1888). (P. A.) FRAUD (Lat. _fraus_, deceit), in its widest sense, a term which has never been exhaustively defined by an English court of law, and for legal purposes probably cannot usefully be defined. But as denoting a cause of action for which damages can be recovered in civil proceedings it now has a clear and settled meaning. In actions in which damages are claimed for fraud, the difficulties and obscurities which commonly arise are due rather to the complexity of modern commerce and the ingenuity of modern swindlers than to any uncertainty or technicality in the modern law. To succeed in such an action, the person aggrieved must first prove a representation of fact, made either by words, by writing or by conduct, which is in fact untrue. Mere concealment is not actionable unless it amounts not only to _suppressio veri_, but to _suggestio falsi_. An expression of opinion or of intention is not enough, unless it can be shown that the opinion was not really held, or that the intention was not really entertained, in which case it must be borne in mind, to use the phrase of Lord Bowen, that the state of a man's mind is as much a matter of fact as the state of his digestion. Next, it must be proved that the representation was made without any honest belief in its truth, that is, either with actual knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless disregard whether it is true or false. It was finally established, after much controversy, in the case of _Derry_ v. _Peek_ in 1889, that a merely negligent misstatement is not actionable. Further, the person aggrieved must prove that the offender made the representation with the intention that he should act on it, though not necessarily directly to him, and that he did in fact act in reliance on it. Lastly, the complainant must prove that, as the direct consequence, he has suffered actual damage capable of pecuniary measurement.