Thither came Carnot, the engineer officer who was in charge of military
affairs In the Committee of Public Safety and is known to history as the
"Organizer of Victory." His views of the strategy to be pursued indicate
either a purely geographical idea of war, which does not square with his
later principles and practice, or, as is far more likely, a profound
disbelief in the capacity of the Army of the North, as it then stood, to
fight a battle, and they went no further than to recommend an inroad
into Flanders on the ground that no enemy would be encountered there.
This, however, in the event developed into an operation of almost
decisive importance, for at the moment of its inception the duke of York
was already on the march. Fighting _en route_ a very severe but
successful action (Lincelles, Aug. 18) with the French troops encamped
near Lille, the Anglo-Hanoverians entered the district--densely
intersected with canals and morasses--around Dunkirk and Bergues on the
21st and 22nd. On the right, by way of Furnes, the British moved towards
Dunkirk and invested the east front of the weak fortress, while on the
left the Hanoverian field marshal v. Freytag moved via Poperinghe on
Bergues. The French had a chain of outposts between Furnes and Bergues,
but Freytag attacked them resolutely, and the defenders, except a brave
handful who stood to cross bayonets, fled in all directions. The east
front of Bergues was invested on the 23rd, and Freytag spread out his
forces to cover the duke of York's attack on Dunkirk, his right being
opposite Bergues and his centre at Bambeke, while his left covered the
space between Roosbrugge and Ypres with a cordon of posts. Houchard was
in despair at the bad conduct of his troops. But one young general,
Jourdan, anticipating Houchard's orders, had already brought a strong
force from Lille to Cassel, whence he incessantly harried Freytag's
posts. Carnot encouraged the garrisons of Dunkirk and Bergues, and
caused the sluices to be opened. The _moral_ of the defenders rose
rapidly. Houchard prepared to bring up every available man of the Army
of the North, and only waited to make up his mind as to the direction in
which his attack should be made. The Allies themselves recognized the
extreme danger of their position. It was cut in half by the Great
Morass, stretches of which extended even to Furnes. Neither Dunkirk nor
Bergues could be completely invested owing to the inundations, and
Freytag sent a message to King George III. to the effect that if Dunkirk
did not surrender in a few days the expedition would be a complete
failure.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive