Of his philosophical doctrine proper, the most striking characteristic is Integration, as opposed to Disintegration, both in thought and in reality. "That which is" is a _whole_, not an _aggregate_; an organic complex of parts, not a mechanical mass; a "whole" too not material but spiritual, a "world of thought-relations." On the critical side this teaching is now admittedly valid against the older empiricism, and the cogency of the reasoning by which his constructive theory is supported is generally recognized. Nevertheless, Green's statement of his conclusions presents important difficulties. Even apart from the impossibility of conceiving a whole of relations which are relations and nothing else (this objection is perhaps largely verbal), no explanation is given of the fact (obvious in experience) that the spiritual entities of which the Universe is composed _appear_ material. Certain elements present themselves in feeling which seem stubbornly to resist any attempt to explain them in terms of thought. While, again, legitimately insisting upon personality as a fundamental constituent in any true theory of reality, the relation between human individualities and the divine Person is left vague and obscure; nor is it easy to see how the existence of several individualities--human or divine--in one cosmos is theoretically possible. It is at the solution of these two questions that philosophy in the immediate future may be expected to work. Green's most important treatise--the _Prolegomena to Ethics_--practically complete in manuscript at his death--was published in the year following, under the editorship of A. C. Bradley (4th ed., 1899). Shortly afterwards R. L. Nettleship's standard edition of his _Works_ (exclusive of the _Prolegomena_) appeared in three volumes: vol. i. containing reprints of Green's criticism of Hume, Spencer, Lewes; vol. ii. Lectures on Kant, on Logic, on the Principles of Political Obligation; vol. iii. Miscellanies, preceded by a full _Memoir_ by the Editor. The _Principles of Political Obligation_ was afterwards published in separate form. A criticism of _Neo-Hegelianism_ will be found in Andrew Seth (Pringle Pattison), _Hegelianism and Personality_. See also articles in _Mind_ (January and April 1884) by A. J. Balfour and Henry Sidgwick, in the _Academy_ (xxviii. 242 and xxv. 297) by S. Alexander, and in the _Philosophical Review_ (vi., 1897) by S. S. Laurie; W. H. Fairbrother, _Philosophy of T. H. Green_ (London and New York, 1896); D. G. Ritchie, _The Principles of State Interference_ (London, 1891); H. Sidgwick, _Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant_ (London, 1905); J. H. Muirhead, _The Service of the State: Four Lectures on the Political Teaching of T. H. Green_ (1908); A. W. Benn, _English Rationalism in the XIXth Century_ (1906), vol. ii., pp. 401 foll. (W. H. F.,* X.)