It was by asking precisely these questions that Hegel gave the finishing
strokes to the Kantian philosophy. The starting-point of all valid
philosophy must be the perception that the essence of all conscious
apprehension is the union of opposites--of which that of subject and
object is the most fundamental and all-pervasive. True, before
differences can be united they must have been separated, but this merely
proves that differentiation or analysis is only one factor in a single
process. Equally fundamental is the element of synthesis. Nor is it
possible at any point in knowledge to prove the existence of a merely
given in whose construction the thinking subject has played no part nor
a merely thinking subject in whose structure the object is not an
organic factor. In coming, as at a certain point in its development it
does, to the consciousness of an object, the mind does not find itself
in the presence of an opponent, or of anything essentially alien to
itself but of that which gives content and stability to its own
existence. True, the stability it seems to find in it is incomplete. The
object cannot rest in the form of its immediate appearance without
involving us in contradiction. The sun does not "rise," the dew does not
"fall." But this only means that the unity between subject and object to
which the gift of consciousness commits us is incompletely realized in
that appearance: the apparent truth has to submit to correction and
supplementation before it can be accepted as real truth. It does not
mean that there is anywhere a mere fact which is not also an
interpretation nor an interpreting mind whose ideas have no hold upon
fact. From this it follows that ultimate or absolute reality is to be
sought not beyond the region of experience, but in the fullest and most
harmonious statement of the facts of our experience. True a completely
harmonious world whether of theory or of practice remains an ideal. But
the fact that we have already in part realized the ideal and that the
degree in which we have realized it is the degree in which we may regard
our experience as trustworthy, is proof that the ideal is no mere idea
as Kant taught, but the very substance of reality.
Stumbling blocks in Hegel's statements.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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