[4] _Ib._ (1893) 275-316. [5] But there are still a few scholars, e.g. van Manen and Völter, who prefer a date about 150 or later; van Loon goes as late as 175. See article "Old-Christian Literature," _Ency. Bib._ iii. col. 3488. IGNORAMUS (Latin for "we do not know," "we take no notice of"), properly an English law term for the endorsement on the bill of indictment made by a grand jury when they "throw out" the bill, i.e. when they do not consider that the case should go to a petty jury. The expression is now obsolete, "not a true bill," "no bill," being used. The expressions "ignoramus jury," "ignoramus Whig," &c., were common in the political satires and pamphlets of the years following on the throwing out of the bill for high treason against the 2nd earl of Shaftesbury in 1681. The application of the term to an ignorant person dates from the early part of the 17th century. The _New English Dictionary_ quotes two examples illustrating the early connexion of the term with the law or lawyers. George Ruggle (1575-1622) in 1615 wrote a Latin play with the title Ignoramus, the name being also that of the chief character in it, intended for one Francis Brakin, the recorder of Cambridge. It is a satire against the ignorance and pettifogging of the common lawyers of the day. It was answered by a prose tract (not printed till 1648) by one Robert Callis, serjeant-at-law. This bore the title of _The Case and Argument against Sir Ignoramus of Cambridge_. IGNORANCE (Lat. _ignorantia_, from _ignorare_, not to know), want of knowledge, a state of mind which in law has important consequences. A well-known legal maxim runs: _ignorantia juris non excusat_ ("ignorance of the law does not excuse"). With this is sometimes coupled another maxim: _ignorantia facti excusat_ ("ignorance of the fact excuses"). That every one who has capacity to understand the law is presumed to know it is a very necessary principle, for otherwise the courts would be continually occupied in endeavouring to solve problems which by their very impracticability would render the administration of justice next to impossible. It would be necessary for the court to engage in endless inquiries as to the true inwardness of a man's mind, whether his state of ignorance existed at the time of the commission of the offence, whether such a condition of mind was inevitable or brought about merely by indifference on his part. Therefore, in English, as in Roman law, ignorance of the law is no ground for avoiding the consequences of an act. So far as regards criminal offences, the maxim as to _ignorantia juris_ admits of no exception, even in the case of a foreigner temporarily in England, who is likely to be ignorant of English law. In Roman law the harshness of the rule was mitigated in the case of women, soldiers and persons under the age of twenty-five, unless they had good legal advice within reach (_Dig._ xxii. 6. 9). Ignorance of a matter of