shape in the principle that the whole work of cognition is in essence analytical. The process of analysis might be complete or incomplete. For finite intelligences there was an inevitable incompleteness so far as knowledge of matters of fact was concerned. In respect to them, the final result was found in a series of irreducible notions or categories, the _prima possibilia_, the analysis and elucidation of which was specifically the business of philosophy or metaphysics. It will be observed that, in the Leibnitzian as in the empirical individualism, the fundamental notion is still that of the abstract separation of the thinking subject from the materials of conscious experience. From this separation arise all the difficulties in the effort to develop the notion systematically, and in tracing the history of Kant's philosophical progress we are able to discern the gradual perception on his part that here was to be found the ultimate cause of the perplexities which became apparent in considering the subordinate doctrines of the system. The successive essays which have already been enumerated as composing Kant's precritical work are not to be regarded as so many imperfect sketches of the doctrines of the _Kritik_, nor are we to look in them for anticipations of the critical view. They are essentially tentative, and exhibit with unusual clearness the manner in which the difficulties of a received theory force on a wider and more comprehensive view. There can be no doubt that some of the special features of the _Kritik_ are to be found in these precritical essays, e.g. the doctrine of the _Aesthetik_ is certainly foreshadowed in the _Dissertation_ of 1770; the _Kritik_, however, is no patchwork, and what appears in the _Dissertation_ takes an altogether new form when it is wrought into the more comprehensive conception of the later treatise.