The striking similarity between Kant's expressions in this _Essay_ and
the remarks with which Hume introduces his analysis of the notion of
cause has led to the supposition that at this period of his
philosophical career Kant was definitely under the influence of the
earlier empirical thinker. Consideration of the whole passage is quite
sufficient to show the groundlessness of this supposition. The
difficulty with which Kant is presented was one arising inevitably
from reflection upon the Leibnitzian theory of knowledge, and the
solution does not in any way go beyond that theory. It is a solution,
in fact, which must have been impossible had the purport of Hume's
empirical doctrine been present to Kant's mind. He is here at the
point at which he remained for many years, accepting without any
criticism certain fundamental notions as required for real cognition.
His ideal of metaphysic is still that of complete analysis of given
notions. No glimmering of the further question, Whence come these
notions and with what right do we apply them in cognition? is yet
apparent. Any direct influence from Hume must be referred to a later
period in his career.
The prize essay _On the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals_
brings forward the same fundamental opposition--though in a special
form. Here, for the first time, appears definitely the distinction
between synthesis and analysis, and in the distinction is found the
reason for the superior certainty and clearness of mathematics as
opposed to philosophy. Mathematics, Kant thinks, proceeds
synthetically, for in it the notions are constructed. Metaphysics, on
the other hand, is analytical in method; in it the notions are given,
and by analysis they are cleared up. It is to be observed that the
description of mathematics as synthetic is not an anticipation of the
critical doctrine on the same subject. Kant does not, in this place,
raise the question as to the reason for assuming that the arbitrary
syntheses of mathematical construction have any reference to reality.
The deeper significance of synthesis has not yet become apparent.
In the _Only Possible Ground of Proof for the Existence of God_, the
argument, though largely Leibnitzian, advances one step farther
towards the ultimate inquiry. For there Kant states as precisely as in
the critique of speculative theology his fundamental doctrine that
real existence is not a predicate to be added in thought to the
conception of a possible subject. So far as subjective thought is
concerned, possibility, not real existence, is contained in any
judgment.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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