Yet it is not a single and unambiguous logical movement that derives from Kant. Kant's lesson was variously understood. Different moments in it were emphasized, with a large diversity of result. As interpreted it was acquiesced in or revolted from and revolt ranged from a desire for some modifications of detail or expression to the call for a radical transformation. Grounds for a variety of developments are to be found in the imperfect harmonization of the rationalistic heritage from the Wolffian tradition which still dominates Kant's pure general logic with the manifest epistemological intention of his transcendental theory. Or again, within the latter in his admission of a duality of thought and "the given" in knowledge, which within knowledge was apparently irreducible, concurrently with hints as to the possibility, upon a wider view, of the sublation of their disparateness at least hypothetically and speculatively. The sense in which there must be a ground of the unity of the supersensible[128] while yet the transcendent use of Reason--i.e. its use beyond the limits of experience was denied theoretical validity--was not unnaturally regarded as obscure. Formal Logic. Kant's treatment of technical logic was wholly traditional, and in itself is almost negligible. It is comprised[129] in an early essay on the mistaken subtlety of the syllogistic figures, and a late compilation by a pupil from the introductory matter and running annotations with which the master had enriched his interleaved lecture-room copy of Meyer's _Compendium_ of 1752. Wolff's general logic, "the best," said Kant, "that we possess," had been abridged by Baumgarten and the abridgment then subjected to commentation by Meyer. With this traditional body of doctrine Kant was, save for matters of minor detail, quite content. Logic was of necessity formal, dealing as it must with those rules without which no exercise of the understanding would be possible at all. Upon abstraction from all particular methods of thought these rules were to be discerned a priori or without dependence on experience by reflection solely upon the use of the understanding in general. The science of the form of thought abstracted in this way from its matter or content was regarded as of value both as propaedeutic and as canon. It was manifestly one of the disciplines in which a position of finality was attainable. Aristotle might be allowed, indeed, to have omitted no essential point of the understanding, what the moderns had achieved consisted in an advance in accuracy and methodical completeness. "Indeed, we do not require any new discoverers in logic,"[130] said the discoverer of a priori synthesis, "since it contains merely the form of thought." Applied logic is merely psychology, and not properly to be called logic at all. The technical logic of Kant, then, justifies literally a movement among his successors in favour of a formal conception of logic with the law of contradiction