point of view that he acknowledges obligation to Mill as well as to
Ueberweg. The transmutation of Mill's induction of inductions into a
postulate is an advance of which the psychological school of logicians
have not been slow to make use. The comparison of Sigwart with Lotze is
instructive, in regard both to their agreement and their divergence as
showing the range of the epistemological formula.
Of the formal-symbolic logic all that falls to be said here is, that
from the point of view of logic as a whole, it is to be regarded as a
legitimate praxis as long as it shows itself aware of the sense in which
alone form is susceptible of abstraction, and is aware that in itself it
offers no solution of the logical problem. "It is not an algebra," said
Kant[148] of his technical logic, and the kind of support lent recently
to symbolic logic by the _Gegenstandstheorie_ identified with the name
of Alexius Meinong (b. 1853)[149] is qualified by the warning that the
real activity of thought tends to fall outside the calculus of relations
and to attach rather to the subsidiary function of denoting. The future
of symbolic logic as coherent with the rest of logic, in the sense which
the word has borne throughout its history seems to be bound up with the
question of the nature of the analysis that lies behind the symbolism,
and of the way in which this is justified in the setting of a doctrine
of validity. The "theory of the object," itself, while affecting logic
alike in the formal and in the psychological conception of it very
deeply, does not claim to be regarded as logic or a logic, apart from a
setting supplied from elsewhere.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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