In the reduced form the inductive syllogism was described by Aldrich as "_Syllogismus in Barbara cujus minor_ (i.e. every M is S) _reticetur_." Whately, on the other hand, proposed an inductive syllogism with the major suppressed, that is, instead of the minor premise above, he supposed a major premise, "Whatever belongs to A, B, C magnets belongs to all." Mill thereupon supposed a still more general premise, an assumption of the uniformity of nature. Since Mill's time, however, the logic of induction tends to revert towards syllogisms more like that of Aristotle. Jevons supposed induction to be inverse deduction, distinguished from direct deduction as analysis from synthesis, e.g. as division from multiplication; but he really meant that it is a deduction from a hypothesis of the law of a cause to particular effects which, being true, verify the hypothesis. Sigwart declares himself in agreement with Jevons; except that, being aware of the difference between hypothetical deduction and mathematical analysis, and seeing that, whereas analysis (e.g. in division) leads to certain conclusions, hypothetical deduction is not certain of the hypothesis, he arrives at the more definite view that induction is not analysis proper but hypothetical deduction, or "reduction," as he proposes to call it. Reduction he defines as "the framing of possible premises for given propositions, or the construction of a syllogism when the conclusion and one premise is given." On this view induction becomes a reduction in the form: all M is P (hypothesis), S is M (given), :. S is P (given). The views of Jevons and Sigwart are in agreement in two main points. According to both, induction, instead of inferring from A, B, C magnets the conclusion "Therefore all magnets attract iron," infers from the hypothesis, "Let every magnet attract iron," to A, B, C magnets, whose given attraction verifies the hypothesis. According to both, again, the hypothesis of a law with which the process starts contains more than is present in the particular data: according to Jevons, it is the hypothesis of a law of a cause from which induction deduces particular effects; and according to Sigwart, it is a hypothesis of the ground from which the particular data necessarily follow according to universal laws. Lastly, Wundt's view is an interesting piece of eclecticism, for he supposes that induction begins in the form of Aristotle's inductive syllogism, S-P, S-M, M-P, and becomes an inductive method in the form of Jevons's inverse deduction, or hypothetical deduction, or analysis, M-P, S-M, S-P. In detail, he supposes that, while an "inference by comparison," which he erroneously calls an affirmative syllogism in the second figure, is preliminary to induction, a second "inference by connexion," which he erroneously calls a syllogism in the third figure with an indeterminate conclusion, is the inductive syllogism itself. This is like Aristotle's inductive syllogism in the arrangement of