the result of an attempt to explain the origin of the "given" in consciousness. The _form_ of things is admittedly subjective; the mind endeavours to explain the _material_ of the given in the same terms, an attempt which is not only impossible but involves a denial of the elementary laws of thought. Knowledge of the given is, therefore, essentially incomplete. Complete or perfect knowledge is confined to the domain of pure thought, to logic and mathematics. Thus the problem of the "thing-in-itself" is dismissed from the inquiry, and philosophy is limited to the sphere of pure thought. The Kantian categories are, indeed, demonstrable and true, but their application to the given is meaningless and unthinkable. By this critical scepticism Maimon takes up a position intermediate between Kant and Hume. Hume's attitude to the empirical is entirely supported by Maimon. The casual concept, as given by experience, expresses not a necessary objective order of things, but an ordered scheme of perception; it is subjective and cannot be postulated as a concrete law apart from consciousness. The main argument of the _Transcendentalphilosophie_ not only drew from Kant, who saw it in MS., the remark that Maimon alone of his all critics had mastered the true meaning of his philosophy, but also directed the path of most subsequent criticism. Maimon's chief works, in addition to the above quoted, are _Philos. Wörterbuch_ (1791); _Streifereien im Gebiete der Philos._(1793); _Über die Progresse der Philos._ (1793); _Die Kategorien des Aristoteles mit Anmerkungen erläutert_ (1794); _Versuch einer neuen Logik_ (1794 and 1798); _Kritische Untersuchungen über den menschl. Geist_ (1797). See _S. Maimons Lebensgeschichte von ihm selbst beschrieben_ (1792, ed. K. P. Moritz; Eng. trans. by J. C. Murray, 1888); Wolff, _Maimoniana_ (1813); Witte, _S. Maimon_ (1876).