Europe -- Politics and government -- 1815-1848; France -- Foreign relations -- Great Britain
There had, for a long time past, been a disposition in England
to regard French relations with Egypt with suspicion. Ever since
Bonaparte's descent upon the country, Egypt was believed to have a
sentimental attraction for the French. Now that by their acquisition
of Algiers, they had gained a footing upon the African shore of
the Mediterranean, this feeling of distrust had increased. It was
remembered that Polignac had seriously entertained the notion of
subsidizing Mehemet Ali and of employing a corps of Egyptian troops
in the Algerian expedition. During the course of Ibrahim's campaign
in Syria, both Stratford Canning and Mandeville had looked with sour
disapproval upon Varennes' efforts to persuade the Porte to allow
France to mediate between the Sultan and the Pasha.[287] But both
the French and English governments were agreed as to the necessity
of preserving the Ottoman Empire and were resolved to prevent, if
possible, the Porte from falling completely under the influence of
Russia. The Duc de Broglie, when he learnt that offers of assistance
had been made to the Sultan by Boutenieff, at once suggested the
joint mediation of France and England in the Turco-Egyptian dispute,
and was greatly disappointed to find that his proposal met with no
response in London. Palmerston, for the present, was content to direct
Lord Ponsonby to proceed from Naples to Constantinople, as ambassador
to the Porte, and to despatch Colonel Campbell to Egypt, in the
capacity of British agent and consul-general, with instructions to
communicate "freely and confidentially" with the French and Austrian
representatives at Alexandria.[288]
It was one of the ironies of the situation that, at this time, when
Russia was suspected of intending to put into execution long-matured
schemes against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, her traditional
policy towards Turkey had in fact been completely reversed. As far
back as the year 1802 the minister, Kotchuby, taking as his text
Montesquieu's doctrine that no Power can have a better neighbour
than a weak State, had drawn up a memorandum to prove that the
preservation, not the destruction, of Turkey should be the object of
Russian policy. More recently, in 1829, when the terms of the peace
of Adrianople were under consideration, the members of the eastern
committee had endorsed Kotchuby's views, and the Tsar Nicholas had
reluctantly adopted their conclusions.[289] Muravieff's instructions
had been drawn strictly in this spirit. Mehemet Ali, Nesselrode laid
down, must not be allowed to reach Constantinople and to overthrow the
existing _régime_. Such a development would be opposed to the Imperial
policy, which aimed at maintaining Turkey in her present "stationary
condition." Should the Pasha succeed in establishing himself at
Constantinople, Russia would be placed "in contact with a strong and
victorious Power instead of a weak and defeated neighbour."[290]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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