Europe -- Politics and government -- 1815-1848; France -- Foreign relations -- Great Britain
hoped and believed, would take place in the near future. Admiral
Lalande was, therefore, clearly justified in encouraging the _Capudan
Pasha_ to surrender his fleet to Mehemet Ali. Although thirteen years
had elapsed since the events referred to in this article had taken
place, the Prince evidently experienced the greatest satisfaction
in remembering that Captain Walker, and the other British naval
instructors of the Ottoman fleet, had been carried off to Alexandria
on ships which were to be handed over to England's enemy, the Pasha of
Egypt.
These successive disasters, Lord Palmerston maintained, should make no
difference in the policy of the Powers. On the contrary, the battle
of Nezib had made it the more imperative that steps should be taken
to check the progress of the victorious Ibrahim.[490] Metternich
held the same opinion. Russia, however, appeared disposed to adopt
a different view of the situation. In 1838, when Mehemet Ali was
threatening to proclaim his independence, she had refused to acquiesce
in Palmerston's proposal that the Turco-Egyptian question should be
submitted to a conference of the Powers.[491] But in the following
spring, when it was plain that the Sultan was resolved to embark
upon war, she had not appeared disinclined to entertain Metternich's
suggestion that the seat of the negotiations should be established at
Vienna. "Each Cabinet," Metternich proposed, "might send its opinion
to its representatives at Vienna, leaving a certain latitude for
discussion, and from a comparison of the five opinions, one should
be sought in which all might coincide."[492] By this arrangement much
delay would be obviated, and the same advantages could be obtained as
by the summoning of the conference, to which Nicholas had objected.
But at the news that, as a consequence of the death of Mahmud and of
the defeat sustained by the Turkish arms at Nezib, the Porte purposed
to open a direct negotiation with the Pasha, the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg once more evinced a strong disinclination to assent to the
plan of establishing a European concert for the settlement of the
eastern question.[493] The disposition which Nicholas thus manifested
to diverge from the policy advocated by Great Britain and Austria, was
hastily seized by France as an opportunity for isolating Russia. The
Soult Cabinet, accordingly, insisted upon the necessity of counselling
the Porte to avoid any precipitate action, and only to treat with
Mehemet Ali through the intermediary of the Powers.[494] Palmerston,
as may be supposed, lost no time in expressing to the Marshal the
satisfaction which he derived from seeing that he was animated by
sentiments coinciding so completely with his own.[495]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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