Europe -- Politics and government -- 1815-1848; France -- Foreign relations -- Great Britain
The Tsar's sudden determination to abandon those advantages, which
he was supposed to have acquired by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi,
has always been ascribed to his desire to separate France and
England. Without doubt, this consideration entered largely into his
calculations. But he was also annoyed with Metternich and was anxious
to thwart his plan of establishing the seat of the negotiations
at Vienna. Moreover, it was now realized that Orloff's treaty was
a document of no practical value. Russia, by reason alone of her
geographical position, could never be prevented from exercising her
influence over the counsels of the Porte. Nor could the stipulation
that the Sultan must close the Dardanelles at the demand of Russia
be of any real utility, seeing that the maritime Powers had refused
to accept this condition, and that Turkey would be unable to carry
out her engagements in the face of their opposition. In a general way
the doctrine that a weak State makes an excellent neighbour might
be sound, but it was plainly inapplicable to Turkey--the custodian
of straits so vitally important to Russia as the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles. Under these circumstances, there was much to be gained by
waiving the purely illusory advantage to be derived from the Treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi, and by agreeing that the closure of the straits to
the warships of the Powers should be declared a law of nations.[518]
Brunnow made no secret of the fact that his Imperial master would be
only too pleased, were France to refuse to accede to his proposals.
His desire was soon gratified. When the project was communicated
to it by Lord Palmerston, the French government flatly declined to
entertain it. The Russian overture, wrote Marshal Soult, was clearly
a device for separating France and England, and it was with "feelings
of painful astonishment" that he perceived "a man of such enlightened
judgment as Lord Palmerston entertain it with so much complacency."
Russia, he proceeded, had betrayed her real intentions by insisting
that she alone should undertake the defence of Constantinople. If
her motives were such as she pretended, why this repugnance to the
idea of "the flags of the allied Courts floating side by side with
her own" in the Bosphorus? "Never," he concluded, "with our consent
shall a foreign squadron of war appear before Constantinople, unless
ours appears there also."[519] Whilst he thus declined absolutely to
consider Baron Brunnow's propositions, Marshal Soult put forward a
plan for the settlement of the questions in dispute between the Porte
and Mehemet Ali. But the solution of the difficulty, suggested by the
French government, when it came to be examined, was found to amount to
little more than an arrangement whereby the Pasha was to obtain the
hereditary tenure of Arabia, Syria and Egypt, in return for which he
was to restore to the Sultan the district of Adana.[520]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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