Amidst all this excitement, whilst in Paris the _bourse_ was panic stricken and in London the funds were falling, Palmerston remained perfectly calm. He had never believed in the danger of a conflict with France, and, in his opinion, the progress of events in the East had rendered still more remote the chances of war.[638] He could not admit that the French people or the French King would ever allow any government to embark upon hostilities with the whole of Europe, in order to preserve Syria for Mehemet Ali. He wrote reassuringly to the Queen[639] to this effect, and strove to calm the apprehensions of his colleagues and to instil into them some of his robust common sense. But the edict of the Porte, by which Mehemet Ali had been deprived of the government of Egypt, had once more stirred his opponents to action. According to Lord John Russell, it was a measure which had never been contemplated by the treaty and had clearly been adopted in consequence of the violent counsels of Lord Ponsonby. Palmerston, although he personally approved of the deposition of the Pasha, had, nevertheless, immediately instructed Granville to inform M. Thiers that it was merely a measure of coercion, and was not intended to prejudge any arrangement which the Sultan might, hereafter, be disposed to make in favour of Mehemet Ali, should he, "at an early moment, accept the conditions of the treaty."[640] Lord John, however, was not to be pacified. War, he asserted, appeared to be imminent, and he insisted upon the necessity of holding a meeting of the Cabinet.[641] Grave consequences, wrote Melbourne to the Queen, were to be apprehended from the Council which he had called for October 10.[642]