Europe -- Politics and government -- 1815-1848; France -- Foreign relations -- Great Britain
Both Palmerston and Stockmar appear to have been convinced that
Talleyrand had prompted his government to protest against the fortress
convention.[177] But their suspicions with regard to him seem to have
been unfounded. In pursuance of his instructions, in his conversations
with Grey and Palmerston, he was bound to employ those arguments most
calculated to induce them to make some concessions to the wishes of
his Court, but his despatches show that he disapproved strongly of
the attitude he was directed to adopt. On December 15, in forwarding
a copy of the fortress treaty, the contents of which he knew would be
exceedingly displeasing to his government, he told Sébastiani plainly
that La Tour-Maubourg's mission to Brussels was largely responsible
for the determination of the four Powers to select the fortresses for
destruction, without regard to the wishes of France. That affair,
moreover, in his opinion, had been managed in a very clumsy fashion.
When the government decided to try to arrange a separate understanding
with Belgium, it should have conducted its negotiations in the
strictest secrecy.[178]
Sébastiani, for the reason which has already been explained, was
precluded from objecting openly to the exclusion of France from the
fortress convention, and was compelled to confine his protests to
remonstrances against the selection of Philippeville and Marienburg
for demolition. Talleyrand was instructed to contend that the
fortifications of these two places, having been erected before 1815,
could not be held to fall within the category of works constructed
at the expense of the Powers. Furthermore, he was to urge that it
was incompatible with the complete independence of Belgium, which
France was anxious to see established, that the Powers should specify
which fortresses King Leopold was to dismantle.[179] Talleyrand,
however, reported that Lord Palmerston was quite unshaken by these
arguments. The British minister gave him clearly to understand that
La Tour-Maubourg's proceedings at Brussels had impressed him most
unfavourably. At the same time, pointing out that Philippeville and
Marienburg were the fortresses in closest proximity to the frontier
of France, he hinted that the French government must have some secret
reason for objecting to their demolition. "Nevertheless," reported
Talleyrand, "I still believe that he is well disposed towards us. He
is, however, in a difficult position as regards the Commons. . . .
We must bring pressure to bear upon the Belgians."[180] Sébastiani's
fears that the policy of the Powers aimed at the re-establishment of
the Holy Alliance, were, he assured him, in language no less emphatic
than that used by Granville in Paris, entirely without foundation.
Far too much importance, he urged, was attached to the fortress
convention. The King's government, in his opinion, would be well
advised to accept it, and to declare publicly that its provisions
were in harmony with the protocol of April 17.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account