In conclusion, I remark that the ease with which the practical character of these fundamental logical categories, fact, meaning, and agreement, may be overlooked or denied is due to the organic way in which practical import is incarnate in them. It can be overlooked because it is so involved in the terms themselves that it is assumed at every turn. The pragmatist is in the position of one who is charged with denying the existence of something because, in pointing out a certain fundamental feature of it, he puts it in a strange light. Such confusion always occurs when the familiar is brought to definition. The difficulties are more psychological--difficulties of orientation and mental adjustment--than logical, and in the long run will be done away with by our getting used to the different viewpoint, rather than by argument. FOOTNOTES: [52] _Studies in Logical Theory_, University of Chicago Press, 1903. [53] Mill's doctrine of the ambiguity of the copula (_Logic_, Book I, chap. IV, § 1) is an instance of one typical way of evading the problem. After insisting with proper force and clearness upon the objective character of our intellectual beliefs and propositions, viz., that when we say fire causes heat we mean actual phenomena, not our ideas of fire and heat (Book I, chap. II and chap. XI, § 1, and chap. V, § 1), he thinks to dispose of the whole problem of the "is" in judgment by saying that it is only a sign of affirmation (chap. I, § 2, and chap. IV, § 1). Of course it is. But unless the affirmation (the sign of thought) "agrees" or "corresponds with" the relations of the phenomena, what becomes of the doctrine of the objective import of propositions? How otherwise shall we maintain with Mill (and with common-sense and science) the difference between asserting "a fact of external nature" and "a fact in my mental history"? [54] _Studies in Philosophy and Psychology_, article by Woodbridge on "The Problem of Consciousness," especially pp. 159-60. [55] In other words, "ideas" is a term capable of assuming any definition which is logically appropriate--say, meaning. It need not have anything to do with the conception of little subjective entities or psychical stuffs. [56] Of course, the monistic epistemologies have an advantage in the statement of the problem over the dualistic--they do not state it in terms which presuppose the impossibility of the solution. [57] This view was originally advanced in the discussion of quite another problem than the one here discussed, viz., the problem of consciousness; and it may not be quite just to dissever it from that context. But as a formula for knowledge it has enough similarity with the one brought out in this paper to suggest further treatment; it is not intended that the results reached here shall apply to the problem of consciousness as such. IX NAÏVE REALISM VS. PRESENTATIVE REALISM[58] I