[88] It must not be overlooked that a mere reminder of an end previously settled upon may operate as a sufficient stimulus to action. It is probably this act of calling the end to mind which the realist confuses with knowledge, and therefore terms apprehension. But there is nothing cognitive about it, any more than there is in pressing a button to give the signal for an act already decided upon. [89] Upholders of this view generally disguise the assumption of repetition by the notion that what is judged is progress in the direction of approximation to an eternal value. But as matter of fact, progress is never judged (as I have had repeated occasion to point out) by reference to a transcendent eternal value, but in reference to the success of the end-in-view in meeting the needs and conditions of the specific situation--a surrender of the doctrine in favor of the one set forth in the text. Logically, the notion of progress as approximation has no place. The thesis should read that we always try to repeat a given value, but always fail as a matter of fact. And constant failure is a queer name for progress. [90] See IX and X _ante_. [91] I use the term "image" in the sense of optics, not of psychology. [92] That something of the cognitive, something of the sign or term function, enters in as a catalyzer, so to speak, in even the most aesthetic experiences, seems to be altogether probable, but that question it is not necessary to raise here. [93] The superstition that whatever influences the action of a conscious being must be an unconscious sensation or perception, if it is not a conscious one, should be summarily dismissed. We are active beings from the start and are naturally, wholly apart from consciousness, engaged in redirecting our action in response to changes in our surroundings. _Alternative_ possibilities, and hence an indeterminate situation, change direct response into a response mediated by a perception as a sign of possibilities, that is, a physiological stimulus into a perceived quality: a sensory datum. [94] Compare Woodbridge, _Journal of Philosophy and Psychology_, X, 5. [95] See Russell, _Scientific Method in Philosophy_, p. 53. [96] _Ibid._, p. 101. [97] See the essay on _The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem_. INDEX Analysis, 37 ff., 426 ff. _See also_ Data; Sensations. Appreciation, 351 ff., 394. Apprehension, simple (also Acquaintance), 15, 352, 380, 408, 420, 430. _See also_ Inference; Perception; Presentationalism. Behavior, 221, 313, 354. _See also_ Consequences; Practical. Bosanquet, B., 149 n. Bush, W. T., 221 n., 250 n. Conflict, as stimulus to thinking, 10 ff., 20, 24, III, 136 ff., 163, 245, 341. _See also_ Practical. Consciousness, 18, 221, 222, 234, 246. Consequences, 31, 213, 308, 321 ff., 330 ff. Constitutive thought, 130. Data, 42 ff., 87, IV, VIII, XI, 345, 401, 427. _See also_ Sensations. Deduction, 53, 435 ff.