Essays in Literature and HistoryFroude, James Anthony
History
Essays in Literature and History
Froude, James Anthony
History; Literature
The opinion of this Review on reasonings of such
a kind has been too often expressed to require us now
to say how insecure they appear to us. When we remember
the thousand conflicting opinions, the truth
of which their several advocates have as little doubted
as they have doubted their own existence, we require
some better evidence than a mere feeling of certainty;
and Aristotle's less pretending canon promises a safer
road. Ho pasi dokei, "what all men think," says Aristotle,
touto einai phamen, "this we say is,"--"and if you will not
have this to be a fair ground of conviction, you will
scarcely find one which will serve you better." We are
to see, however, what these idete are which Spinoza
offers as self-evident. All will turn upon that; for, of
course, if they are self-evident, if they do produce
conviction, nothing more is to be said; but it does,
indeed, appear strange to us that Spinoza was not
staggered as to the validity of his canon, when his
friends, every one of them, so floundered and stumbled
among what he regarded as his simplest propositions,
requiring endless signa veritalis, and unable for a long
time even to understand their meaning, far less to
"recognize them as elementary certainties." Modern
readers may, perhaps, be more fortunate. We produce
at length the definitions and axioms of the first book
of the "Ethica," and they may judge for themselves:--
DEFINITIONS.
1. By a thing which is causa sui, its own cause, I mean a
thing the essence of which involves the existence of it, or a
thing which cannot be conceived of except as existing.
2. I call a thing finite, suo genere, when it can be
circumscribed by another (or others) of the same nature, e.g.
a given body is called finite, because we can always conceive
another body larger than it; but body is not circumscribed
by thought, nor thought by body.
3. By substance I mean what exists in itself and is conceived
of by itself; the conception of which, that is, does
not involve the conception of anything else as the cause
of it.
4. By attribute I mean whatever the intellect perceives of
substance as constituting the essence of substance.
5. Mode is an affection of substance, or is that which is
in something else, by and through which it is conceived.
6. God is a being absolutely infinite; a substance consisting
of infinite attributes, each of which expresses His
eternal and infinite essence.
EXPLANATION.
I say absolutely infinite, not infinite suo genere, for of
what is infinite sua genere only, the attributes are not
infinite but finite; whereas what is infinite absolutely contains
in its own essence everything by which substance can be
expressed and which involves no impossibility.
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