When Jōshu asked Kwanchu (Tai-tz‘u Huan-chung)[6.40] of the ninth century, “What is the being [or substance] of Prajñā?” Kwanchu without giving any answer simply echoed the question, “What is the being of Prajñā?” And this brought out a hearty laugh on the part of Jōshu. Prajñā may be translated supreme intelligence, and Mañjuśrī is regarded by the Mahayanists as the embodiment of Prajñā. But in this case Mañjuśrī has nothing to do with it. The question is concerned with the substantial conception of Prajñā, which, being a form of mental activity, requires something to abide in. According to Buddhist philosophy, there are three fundamental conceptions to explain the problem of existence: Substance or Being (_bhāva_), Appearance or Aspect (_lakshaṇa_), and Function or Activity (_kṛitya_). Or, to use the terms of the _Mādhyamika_, the three conceptions are actor, act, and acting. Prajñā being an intellectual acting, there must be an agent or substance back of it. Hence the question: What is the being or body of Prajñā? Now, the answer or echo given out by Kwanchu does not explain anything, we are at a loss as far as its conceptual signification goes. The Zen masters do not give us any literary clue to get around what we see on the surface. When we try to understand it intellectually, it slips away from us. It must be approached therefore from another plane of unconsciousness. Unless we move on to the same plane where the masters stand, or unless we abandon so-called common-sense way of reasoning, there is no possible bridge which will carry us over the chasm dividing our intellection from their apparently psittacine repetitions.