it is asserted, that it is a necessary power, because the states might omit making rules for the purpose, and thereby defeat the existence of that branch of the government; this is what logicians call _argumentum absurdum_; for the different states, if they will have any security at all in this government, will find it in the house of representatives, and they, therefore, would be very ready to eradicate a principle in which it dwells, or involve their country in an instantaneous revolution. Besides, if this was the apprehension of the framers, and the ground of that provision, why did not they extend this controlling power to the other duties of the several state legislatures? To exemplify this, the states are to appoint senators and electors for choosing of a president; but the time is to be under the direction of congress. Now, suppose they were to omit the appointment of senators and electors, though congress was to appoint the time, which might well be apprehended, as the omission of regulations for the election of members of the house of representatives, provided they had that power; or suppose they were not to meet at all; of course, the government cannot proceed in its exercise. And from this motive or apprehension, congress ought to have taken these duties entirely in their own hands, and, by a decisive declaration, annihilated them, which they in fact have done by leaving them without the means of support, or at least resting on their bounty. To this the advocates for this system oppose the common, empty declamation, that there is no danger that congress will abuse this power; but such language, as relative to so important a subject, is mere vapor, and formed without sense. Is it not in their power, however, to make such regulations as may be inconvenient to you? It must be admitted, because the words are unlimited in their sense. It is a good rule, in the construction of a contract, to suppose that what may be done will be; therefore, in considering this subject, you are to suppose that in the exercise of this government, a regulation of congress will be made for holding an election for the whole state at Poughkeepsie, at New York, or, perhaps, at Fort Stanwix; who will then be the actual electors for the house of representatives? You ought certainly to have as much or more distrust with respect to the exercise of these powers by congress, than congress ought to have with respect to the exercise of those duties which ought to be entrusted to the several states, because over them congress can have a legislative controlling power.