XLVII. From what has been premised, it may be inferred, that no contingent can ever happen, in which an informant or voter can consistently shew favour, or be partial to any man, either in such an instance as we have just mentioned, or in any other whatever, judicial or extrajudicial; because as we have shewn, competitions between subjects of equal merit do not admit of it, and if the merits of the competitors are unequal, the injustice of such a proceeding is self-evident; consequently, to him who acts conscientiously, all recommendations or solicitations are useless and improper; for he will not be biassed by friendship, country, gratitude, school-alliances, religion, college-connections, or any other motives whatever. But the misfortune is, that in the practice of the world, we see but few examples of such disinterested and upright conduct, even in cases where the merits of candidates are unequal; but on the contrary, whenever an opposition is set on foot, the favourers of each candidate, are more occupied in canvassing suffrages, than in studying questions, and more busied in examining the connections of voters, than books of faculty. The abuse is carried to such a length, that sometimes a man’s acting with integrity is imputed to him as a crime. If a voter, who is solicited by a man of eminence, answers ingenuously, and excuses himself from complying with what is requested of him; they say he is a rough, ill-bred, unpolished man: if he does not yield to the solicitations of a benefactor, they call him ungrateful; and if he does not give way to the intreaties of a friend, they exclaim that he is callous to the feelings of friendship. Finally, it appears to me, that a more intolerable error than this cannot exist, for I have seen men much esteemed by the generality of mankind for their worth, who have always prostituted their votes to these or some other temporal motives; but in the name of reason, can a man have any friend so great or so good as God? Is there any benefactor, to whom we owe so much as to him? How shall we reconcile this? Can he be called a grateful, an honourable, or a good man, who can be wanting in his duty to his best friend and greatest benefactor, by acting unjustly to oblige a creature, to whom he owes this or that limited respect, and to whom also it is impossible he should owe any thing whatever, but what he owes principally, and in the first instance to God? In vain I have urged these arguments in various private conversations; and I believe it is in vain also, that I now use them with the public at large; but if they shall not be effectual to amend the abuse, they will at least serve to disburthen my mind, and give vent to my chagrin. ON TRUE AND FALSE URBANITY. SECT. I.