XLV. Having spoken in this discourse, of the favour that may be shewed to a countryman in preference to a stranger, in case he is a man of equal merit, I thought it would not be improper here, to take notice of a moral point, which frequently occurs in practice, and in which I have often seen men mistake, who in other respects are far from absurd. Those, who have annexed to their charges the distribution of honourable and useful employments, if they have not a perfect knowledge of the competitors for a vacant place, commonly avail themselves of judicial or extrajudicial informations touching their merits. This is a case that often occurs in the appointment to such professorships in many universities, as are in the disposal of the king, or his supreme council; and in these instances, all the doctors of this university of Oveido give their information to the royal council promiscuously. It is to be supposed, that the person, who by his own or delegated authority appoints to the office, when two persons of equal merit are proposed to him, may very consistently chuse which he pleases; but with respect to the equality of merit, if he is a stranger to the parties, he must be guided by the informations he receives; and I have seen it very common, when they had no just reason for doing it, for people to give their information in favour of the man they liked best, and I have known them go so far, as not only to recommend him in preference to his competitor, but to represent him as the only person qualified to fill the vacant office. XLVI. I call this an error, because that in my opinion, such an information upon the face of it, is injurious and void of all probability, which I shall endeavour to demonstrate, by exposing the malice and indirect proceeding of him, who between two equal subjects, Peter and John for example, gives his information in favour of Peter, in preference to John; for I perceive in such behaviour, not only one, but three serious and distinct offences. And first, he offends materially in his information, against the virtue of legal and impartial justice, which requires, that he should represent people according to the true degree of their merits; but he swerves from this principle, who represents Peter as superior to John, when he is not so in reality. Secondly, he behaves unworthily and unjustly to his Prince, by usurping and preoccupying the right, which he has to chuse between the parties. Thirdly, he is guilty of injustice to the said John, who has a right to be represented according to the true degree of merit he possesses; and the proposing him as inferior to Peter, when in truth he is equal to him, is doing him a manifest injury, which besides prejudicing him with regard to other contingencies, renders it impossible in this instance, for him to partake of the king’s grace of chusing him in preference to his competitor Peter.