XXVI. But how shall we define what should be termed prodigality in princes? Why by calling all that such, which is commonly stiled liberality. The vulgar, and even those who are superior to the vulgar, allow of a large extension, to the arbitrary and voluntary expences of princes. It is commonly understood, that when a prince from caprice, or from particular affections for a subject, makes him a present, that the donation should be proportioned to the power and grandeur of the person who bestows it; but I consider the thing in quite a different light. Whatever considerable sum of the public money is expended, which is not laid out, directly or indirectly, to advance the public benefit, is injustice and profusion. That which comes out of the pockets of the public, should be expended in such things as are beneficial to the public. Would it not be most unjust providence, to apply, for the sake of indulging the caprice or ostentation of a sovereign, that which is contributed by millions of people, to enrich a particular person, who by some chance accident, in a matter that was of little importance to the community, has done something that was agreeable to, and that has gained him the favour of his prince? XXVII. Alexander ordered his treasurer to give to the philosopher Anaxarchus, any sum of money he should desire. He requested a hundred talents; and the treasurer informed Alexander of the excessive demand of the philosopher; to which Alexander answered, _he has done very right, for he well knows that he has a friend who is both able and willing to give him that sum_; and ordered the treasurer to pay him the money immediately. Is this liberality? It is true, that it is celebrated as such in an infinite number of books; but I say, that it was no such thing, for that it should rather have been termed mad prodigality, which is the legitimate child of vain-glory; and that it was not only prodigality, but cruelty and tyranny. With those hundred talents, he might have administered to many distresses; and if a prince has superfluities, he should lay them out for such purposes. But refraining to administer to the hunger and necessities of numbers of poor people, to satiate the gluttonous cravings of an avaricious philosopher, was a glaring act of partiality, which rendered it doubtful, which of the two was the most unjust person, Anaxarchus for demanding such a sum, or Alexander for gratifying him in his demand.