And I am not conscious of any other influences by which the process has been affected. It is possible, however, that there may have been influences of which I am not conscious; and my opposition to M. Comte’s system may have been one of them. The presentation of antagonistic thoughts, often produces greater definiteness and development of one’s own thoughts. It is probable that the doctrines set forth in the essay on “The Genesis of Science,” might never have been reached, had not my dissent from M. Comte’s conception, led me to work them out; and but for this, I might not have arrived at the classification of the sciences exhibited in the foregoing essay. Possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus of {139} repugnance to M. Comte’s views, may have aided in elaborating my own views; though I cannot call to mind any other cases. Let it by no means be supposed from all I have said, that I do not regard M. Comte’s speculations as of value. True or untrue, his system as a whole, has doubtless produced important and salutary revolutions of thought in many minds; and will doubtless do so in many more. Doubtless, too, not a few of those who dissent from his general views, have been healthfully stimulated by consideration of them. The presentation of scientific knowledge and method as a whole, whether rightly or wrongly co-ordinated, cannot have failed greatly to widen the conceptions of most of his readers. And he has done especial service by familiarizing men with the idea of a social science, based on the other sciences. Beyond which benefits resulting from the general character and scope of his philosophy, I believe that there are scattered through his pages many large ideas that are valuable not only as stimuli, but for their actual truth. It has been by no means an agreeable task to make these personal explanations; but it has seemed to me a task not to be avoided. Differing so profoundly as I do from M. Comte on all fundamental doctrines, save those which we inherit in common from the past; it has become needful to dissipate the impression that I agree with him—needful to show that a large part of what is currently known as “positive philosophy,” is not “positive philosophy” in the sense of being peculiarly M. Comte’s philosophy; and to show that beyond that portion of the so-called “positive philosophy” which is not peculiar to him, I dissent from it. And now at the close, as at the outset, let me express my great regret that these explanations should have been called forth by the statements of a critic who has treated me so liberally. Nothing will, I fear, prevent the foregoing pages from appearing like a very ungracious response to M. Laugel’s sympathetically-written review. I can only hope that the gravity of the question at issue, in so far as it {140} concerns myself, may be taken in mitigation, if not as a sufficient apology. NOTE.