“But I think that Mr. Spencer’s representation of Kant’s view is very incorrect; he seems to be misled by the large term non-ego. Kant held that Space and Time were _in their origin_ subjective, but when applied to the non-ego resulted in phenomena, and were the formal element in those phenomena, among which some were phenomena of the internal sense or ego, others of the external sense or non-ego. The non-ego to which the forms of Space and Time did not apply and did not belong, was the Ding-an-sich, not the {230} phenomenal non-ego. Hence the objective existence of Space and Time in phenomena, but not in the Ding-an-sich, is a consistent and necessary consequence of Kant’s view of their subjective origin.” If I have misunderstood Kant, as thus alleged, then my comment must be that I credited him with an hypothesis less objectionable than that which he held. I supposed his view to be that Space, as a form of intuition belonging to the _ego_, is imposed by it on the _non-ego_ (by which I understood the thing in itself) in the act of intuition. But now the Kantian doctrine is said to be that Space, originating in the _ego_, when applied to the _non-ego_, results in phenomena (the _non-ego_ meant being, in that case, necessarily the Ding-an-sich, or thing in itself); and that the phenomena so resulting become objective existences along with the Space given to them by the subject. The subject having imposed Space as a form on the primordial object, or thing in itself, and so created phenomena, this Space thereupon becomes an objective existence, independent of both the subject and the original thing in itself! To Dr. Hodgson this may seem a more tenable position than that which I ascribed to Kant; but to me it seems only a multiplication of inconceivabilities. I am content to leave it as it stands: not feeling my reasons for rejecting the Kantian hypothesis much weakened.[26] The remaining reply which Dr. Hodgson makes runs thus:― “But Mr. Spencer has a second argument to prove this inconceivability. It is this:—‘If Space and Time are forms of thought, they can never be {231} thought of; since it is impossible for anything to be at once the _form_ of thought and the _matter_ of thought.’ . . . . An instance will show the fallacy best. Syllogism is usually held to be a form of thought. Would it be any argument for the inconceivability of syllogisms to say, they cannot be at once the form and the matter of thought? Can we not syllogize about syllogism? Or, more plainly still,—no dog can bite himself, for it is impossible to be at once the thing that bites and the thing that is bitten.”