Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
This statement has caused me no little astonishment. That having
before him the volume from which he quotes, so competent a reader
should have so completely missed the meaning of the passages (§ 26)
already referred to, in which I have contended against Hamilton and
Mansel, makes me almost despair of being understood by any ordinary
reader. In that section I have, in the first place, contended that
the consciousness of an Ultimate Reality, though not capable of being
made a thought, properly so called, because not capable of being
brought within limits, nevertheless remains as a consciousness that is
_positive_: is not rendered _negative_ by the negations of limits. I
have pointed out that―
“The error, (very naturally fallen into by philosophers intent
on demonstrating the limits and conditions of consciousness),
consists in assuming that consciousness contains _nothing but_
limits and conditions; to the entire neglect of that which is
limited and conditioned. It is forgotten that there is something
which alike forms the raw material of definite thought and remains
after the definiteness which thinking gave to it has been {234}
destroyed”—something which “ever persists in us as the body of a
thought to which we can give no shape.”
This _positive_ element of consciousness it is which, “at once
necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible,” I regard as
the consciousness of the Unknowable Reality. Yet Dr. Hodgson says “Mr.
Spencer proceeds to use these inconceivable ideas as the basis of his
philosophy:” implying that such basis consists of negations, instead
of consisting of that which persists _notwithstanding the negation of
limits_. And then, beyond this perversion, or almost inversion, of
meaning, he conveys the notion that I take as the basis of philosophy,
the “inconceivable ideas” “or self-contradictory notions” which result
when we endeavour to comprehend Space and Time. He speaks of me as
proposing to evolve substance out of form, or rather, out of the
negations of forms—gives his readers no conception that the _Power_
manifested to us is that which I regard as the Unknowable, while
what we call Space and Time answer to the unknowable _nexus_ of its
manifestations. And yet the chapter from which I quote, and still more
the chapter which follows it, makes this clear—as clear, at least, as I
can make it by carefully-worded statements and re-statements.
* * * * *
Philosophical systems, like theological ones, following the law of
evolution in general, severally become in course of time more rigid,
while becoming more complex and more definite; and they similarly
become less alterable—resist all compromise, and have to be replaced by
the more plastic systems that descend from them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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