Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
“Still more manifest will this truth become when it is observed that
our conception of the Relative itself disappears, if our conception
of the Absolute is a pure negation. It is admitted, or rather it is
contended, by the writers I have quoted above, that contradictories
can be known only in relation to each other—that Equality, for
instance, is unthinkable apart from its correlative Inequality; and
that thus the Relative can itself be conceived only by opposition
to the Non-relative. It is also admitted, or rather contended, that
the consciousness of a relation implies a consciousness of both
the related members. If we are required to conceive the relation
between the Relative and Non-relative without being conscious of
both, ‘we are in fact’ (to quote the words of Mr. Mansel differently
applied) ‘required to compare that of which we are conscious with
that of which we are not conscious; the comparison itself being an
act of consciousness, and only possible through the consciousness of
both its objects.’ What, then, becomes of the assertion that, ‘the
Absolute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability,’ or
as ‘the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is
possible?’ If the Non-relative or Absolute, is present in thought only
as a mere negation, then the relation between it and the Relative
becomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is
absent from consciousness. {251} And if this relation is unthinkable,
then is the Relative itself unthinkable, for want of its antithesis:
whence results the disappearance of all thought whatever.”—_First
Principles_, § 26.
On this argument Mr. Martineau comments as follows; first re-stating it
in other words:―
“Take away its antithetic term, and the relative, thrown into
isolation, is set up as absolute, and disappears from thought. It
is indispensable therefore to uphold the Absolute in existence,
as condition of the relative sphere which constitutes our whole
intellectual domain. Be it so: but when saved on this plea,—to
preserve the balance and interdependence of two _co_-relatives,—the
‘Absolute’ is absolute no more; it is reduced to a term of relation:
it loses therefore its exile from thought: its disqualification is
cancelled: and the alleged nescience is discharged.
“So, the same law of thought which warrants the existence, dissolves
the inscrutableness, of the Absolute.”—_Essays, Philosophical and_
_Theological_ pp. 186–7.
I admit this to be a telling rejoinder; and one which can be met only
when the meanings of the words, as I have used them, are carefully
discriminated, and the implications of the doctrine fully traced out.
We will begin by clearing the ground of minor misconceptions.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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