Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
Before the major criticism which I propose to make on this hypothesis,
let me make a minor one. Not only of space-relations, but also of
primary physical properties, Mr. Martineau asserts the necessity: not
a necessity to our minds simply, but an ontological necessity. What
is true for human thought, is, in respect of these, true absolutely:
“the laws of curvature, measure, and proportion,” as we know them, are
unchangeable even by Divine power; as are also the Divisibility and
Incompressibility of Matter. But if, in these cases, Mr. Martineau
holds that a necessity in thought implies an answering necessity in
things, why does he refrain from saying the like in other cases?
Why, if he tacitly asserts it in respect of space-relations and the
statical attributes of Body, does he not also assert it in respect of
the dynamical attributes of Body? The laws conformed to by that mode
of force now distinguished as “energy,” are as much necessary to our
thought as are the laws of space-relations. The axioms of Mechanics
lie on the same plane with the axioms of pure Mathematics. Now if
Mr. Martineau admits this—if he admits, as he must, the corollary
that there can be no such manifestation of energy as that displayed
in the motion of a planet, save at the expense of equivalent energy
which pre-existed—if he draws the further necessary corollary that
the direction of a motion cannot be changed by any action, without an
equal reaction in an opposite direction on something acting—if he bears
in mind that this holds not only of all visible motions, celestial
and terrestrial, but that those activities of Body which affect us as
secondary properties, are also known only through other forms of {257}
energy, which are equivalents of mechanical energy and conform to
these same laws—and if, lastly, he infers that none of these derivative
energies can have given to them their characters and directions,
save by pre-existing forces, statical and dynamical, conditioned in
special ways; what becomes of that “realm of Divine originality” which
Mr. Martineau describes as remaining within the realm of necessity?
Consistently carried out, his argument implies a universally-inevitable
order, in which volition can have no such place as that he alleges.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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